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“The atomic bomb was an interesting intelligence problem …”(R. V. Jones, Director of 
Scientific Intelligence1) 
Intelligence has long played an integral role in the context of western and broader 
international responses to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to contain the 
associated technology, materials and expertise. There are, of course, many challenges 
associated with accurately assessing proliferation intentions, processes, programmes and the 
underlying scientific and technical wherewithal. There is also an uneven record in this respect. 
On the one hand, the inaccuracy and misjudgements that characterized the British and 
American intelligence assessments related to Iraq's nuclear and other weapons programmes 
in 2002–3 resulted in a costly war of choice to topple the Saddam Hussein regime fought 
officially on the erroneous grounds of forcible disarmament. The understandable controversy 
that followed regarding the lack of evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has, 
arguably, clouded what have otherwise been several important intelligence successes in 
recent years. Indeed, intelligence collection and analysis has played a pivotal role in national 
and international responses to the suspect nuclear activities of Libya, Iran and Syria since 
2001. 
US-UK intelligence efforts vis-à-vis the A. Q. Khan proliferation network provided significant 
insights into the increasingly trans-national and non-state-based nature of proliferation and 
were a major contribution to nuclear rollback in Libya.2 Lord Butler's review of British 
intelligence noted the ‘uncovering and dismantlement of this network is a remarkable tribute 
to the work of the intelligence agencies’.3 Moreover, the timely insights into the nature of 
Libya's nuclear activities provided by American and British intelligence helped to increase the 
pressure on the regime and to accelerate and cement its decision of December 2003 to abandon 
its nuclear and other WMD programmes.4 Significantly, this included the interdiction in 
October 2003 of the rather innocuous-sounding BBC China – a boat en route to Libya to deliver 
a cargo of gas centrifuge enrichment equipment from the A. Q. Khan network to the country's 
nuclear weapons programme. The intelligence gathered on Libya increased US-UK 
confidence in the subsequent dismantlement of the weapons programmes, and British and 
American intelligence officers also played a pivotal role in bringing the Libyans to the 
negotiating table through ‘covert diplomacy’. This intelligence success helped to lay the 
foundations for the UK and Libya to foster closer trade links in the years following: the 
unpromising start of counter-proliferation intelligence made a significant contribution to the 
development of a useful bilateral link that was only scuppered by the Arab Spring-inspired 
uprising in late 2010, and which resulted in Colonel Gadhaffi's overthrow in October 2011. 
Iran's nuclear programme has become a key focus of western intelligence agencies, although 
intelligence assessments have caused some controversy in this case too. In December 2007, for 
example, the public release of the summary findings of the US National Estimate (NIE) on 
Iran's nuclear programme and intentions, which concluded in part that Iran had ‘halted’ its 
military nuclear activities in 2003, significantly undermined the position of those arguing at 
that time in favour of using military force to enforce non-proliferation in this 
context.5 Moreover, US allies in Europe reportedly assessed that Iran had probably continued 
to work on weaponization after 2003.6  
More recently, at a G8 meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2009, Presidents Barack Obama 
and Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown released previously secret US, French 
and British intelligence on Iran's efforts to construct a clandestine enrichment facility inside a 
mountain about 20 miles from the city of Qom. The announcement was prompted by Iran's 
realization that the facility had been identified by external intelligence organizations which 
prompted it to deliver ‘a vague, terse letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency’ 
(IAEA) noting that a second uranium enrichment site was being built.7 The site was 
subsequently placed under IAEA Safeguards. There has also been a suggestion that the UK 
Secret Intelligence Service has engaged in covert measures to disrupt Iran's weaponization 
efforts.8  
In neighbouring Syria two years previously in 2007, Israel had launched a preventive military 
attack against a suspected clandestine heavy water reactor under construction.9 The discovery 
of the reactor by Israel had reportedly occurred after a review of all potentially relevant 
intelligence on nuclear proliferation in the region following its failure to detect Libya's 
acquisitions via the A. Q. Khan network.10 In April 2008, US intelligence officials subsequently 
gave a public and very detailed briefing on the intelligence case against Syria and its suspected 
clandestine plutonium reactor which Israeli aircraft had destroyed the previous 
September.11 While Israel had informed Washington of the existence of the Syrian site prior to 
the attack, the Bush administration opted not to launch a military strike of its own.12  
 
Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation 
 
Nuclear proliferation is a dynamic process characterized by evolving political motivations, 
opaque strategic intentions and an ever-changing technical backdrop, typified by often 
innovative illicit procurement techniques and elaborate deception efforts on the part of 
proliferators to conceal the existence, or progress, of nuclear weapons related activities. 
Indeed, Ellis and Kiefer note that ‘since the nature of the specific proliferation challenges 
presented by states, as well as their underlying motives, varies considerably, it is unlikely that 
a one-size-fits-all policy will achieve the desired non-proliferation objectives in every 
case’.13 They further emphasize that ‘forecasting trends, divining intentions, and estimating 
capabilities are central to understanding the proliferation enterprise’.14  
The dynamic nature of proliferation has obvious implications in itself, but it also has far 
reaching connotations when considered from the perspective of intelligence collection and 
analysis. Certainly, intelligence is central to understanding and coping with or managing the 
nuclear proliferation problem, whether the focus is the target country itself or the locations 
from and the transit routes via which materials, equipment, components and knowledge are 
sourced. The pre-eminence of intelligence comes from the lengths to which proliferators seek 
to hide their efforts, and nuclear weapons programmes are invariably the most secret aspect 
of what tend to be very secretive regimes. As Lord Butler concluded, ‘proliferating states 
usually represent difficult targets for intelligence collectors, and weapons programmes are 
usually particularly difficult targets within them’.15 Similarly, the United States' WMD 
Commission report gloomily recorded: ‘there is no single strategy the Intelligence Community 
can pursue to counter the “proliferation” menace’.16 This raises the question of what policy 
makers can reasonably hope that intelligence might achieve if there is no magic formula to 
hand. 
From the perspective of intelligence, capabilities and intentions are two very different things. 
In terms of capability, a nuclear weapons programme is an incredibly expensive and 
complicated entity and, to be successful, will generally require several key elements: access to 
sufficient financial resources; a solid scientific base ranging from scientists at the top down to 
competent engineering technicians at the bottom; sufficient quantities of raw material; the 
industrial and engineering wherewithal to manufacture a weapon; and an effective 
procurement mechanism to secure infusions of technology, materials and technical 
knowledge from abroad as and when necessary. Bringing all of this together also requires 
effective leadership and skilled management at various levels across a programme. From an 
intelligence perspective then, an awareness of the capability of a state requires addressing 
certain essential questions including among others: what is the state of the scientific 
infrastructure in country x? What level of training in nuclear-related subjects is on offer? Have 
scientists studied abroad and if so where and with whom? What technologies and materials 
can be sourced domestically and what will need to be acquired from abroad? 
Most elements on the capability side of the equation are, generally speaking, more 
straightforward to spot and to understand. A nuclear weapons programme will, of necessity, 
be a large-scale endeavour with numerous different sites often deployed across a country. 
While physical manifestations of weapons programmes such as buildings can often be located, 
intelligence efforts can also be confounded through active deception efforts on the part of the 
target state, such as using dual-use facilities, building plants underground or using front 
companies and fake end-use declarations as part of strategic procurement efforts. While a 
certain amount of information can be inferred from the size, layout and history of facilities, it 
is still vital to discover what is actually taking place within them in order to keep pace with 
progress. Moreover, because it is extremely unlikely that everything required for a weapons 
programme can be produced domestically, monitoring financial transactions and 
procurement patterns becomes crucial and can be very productive avenues of inquiry for 
intelligence collection and analysis.17  
Capability can, of course, be split into two because a theoretical capability is a very different 
prospect to a practical capability, yet the two do not necessarily follow on sequentially. In other 
words, a state may have the theoretical knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon, but lack 
the practical means to do so. Alternatively, of course, a state may have the practical means to 
build a weapon but lack the scientific know-how because of an inability to interpret theoretical 
plans, for example. But knowledge of capability alone, whether theoretical or practical, cannot 
reveal everything. Indeed, perhaps the first signal that a state may be contemplating a nuclear 
weapons programme will involve an assessment of intentions. However, intentions are far 
more difficult to discern than capabilities. As former CIA chief weapons hunter David Kay 
testified to the US Senate: ‘the real challenge for intelligence is going to be getting to our 
political leadership not just judgments about capabilities, but judgements about real 
intentions. And that is tough’.18 Indeed, when it comes to preventing proliferation the focus 
of intelligence efforts will be on gauging strategic intention; the desire to acquire a nuclear 
weapon in the first place. Yet, it may also be important to distinguish between other types of 
intention such as latent intention characterized by a desire to draw together the infrastructure 
and knowledge required to build a nuclear weapon, but without actually taking a political 
decision to do so. A tactical intention might include, for example, the desire to actually use a 
weapon once acquired or to retain it as a last resort capability. While the different types of 
intention may be related one does not necessarily imply another. Thus, the delineation 
between capabilities and intentions is not always a neat and tidy one. The close relationship 
between the two and the blurring of their use can, and has, led to poor quality intelligence 
estimates.19  
Expanding the Literature 
 
Although in recent years proliferation-related intelligence has become a topic frequently 
mentioned in media reports, and has been central to recent crises and conflicts in Iran and 
Iraq, there is a remarkably small literature dedicated to this topic.20 Given the historic, current 
and future importance of the subject, and the need for policy makers to firmly grasp both the 
utility and limitations of intelligence in this context when formulating policy options, the 
limited nature of the literature is a cause of concern. It is for this reason that the Centre for 
Science and Security Studies, King's College London, organized a conference in June 2010 to 
examine the nature, role, utility and limitations of intelligence collection, analysis and 
assessment vis-à-vis the scientific, technical and motivational dimensions of nuclear 
proliferation. Funded as part of a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, the aim was to 
generate original knowledge and understanding of how nuclear intelligence has been and 
could potentially be applied to uncover and understand historical and contemporary cases of 
proliferation. An important underlying rationale was to understand the factors that have 
contributed to misjudgements on the part of intelligence organizations with regard to both 
under-estimating and over-estimating specific challenges and problems in the nuclear 
proliferation field. The importance of examining and learning from ‘misjudgements in both 
directions’ was highlighted in the UK context as a key lesson in Lord Butler's Review of 
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction following the Iraq invasion.21  
Originally drafted for the conference in June 2010, the six articles in this special issue 
of Intelligence and National Security each address a specific issue under the broad header of 
intelligence and nuclear proliferation. The three contributions by Montgomery and Mount, 
Desouza and Lau, and Ryan all focus on the issue of intelligence success and failure. The 
papers collectively consider a range of case-studies – A. Q. Khan, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel and 
North Korea – and evaluate the performance of the US intelligence community. The results 
do not make for happy reading. Although there is clearly a recognition that nuclear weapons 
programmes represent some of the most difficult intelligence targets, and that active denial 
and deception techniques are the norm, the historical analyses in these studies suggest that 
the US has more often got it wrong than right in predicting when a nation might develop a 
nuclear capability. The authors have found, variously, challenges and problems at all stages 
of the intelligence cycle, from the identification of sources, to analysis, to politicization of the 
intelligence process. In many ways this should come as no surprise; indeed, it is somewhat 
reassuring to read that no one factor has consistently led to the failures. What these articles do 
highlight is that there is no quick fix to the problems and that the inherent difficulties of the 
intelligence challenge are such that success will be the rarity. This raises a further point, 
namely a reconsideration of what could or should be expected from the intelligence 
community in this arena? 
The three other articles by Ogilvie-White, Acton and Schulte consider intelligence and nuclear 
proliferation in the context of international efforts to verify the compliance of states with 
formal non-proliferation commitments. As each of the authors illustrates, the use of 
intelligence by international verification organizations, notably the IAEA, has been fraught 
with controversy and contention primarily due to concerns, right or wrong, over the 
impartiality and questionable motives of some governments that provide information to assist 
the verification process. At the same time, however, it is also recognized that organizations 
like the IAEA need to enhance their collection and use of intelligence whether this is provided 
by member states, derived from open sources such as scientific and technical literature or 
accessed via commercial satellite imagery. The authors give due consideration to ideas to 
enhance the use of intelligence by international verification organizations and to reduce 
political opposition on the part of some states. Among other things, ideas are proposed for 
establishing a General Accountability Obligation on the part of states that sign up to 
international non-proliferation/disarmament commitments (Schulte); building wider 
support for cooperative intelligence initiatives among developing countries (Ogilvie-White); 
and developing greater trust between the international verification organizations and national 
intelligence agencies (Acton). Ultimately, it becomes clear from the latter three articles that the 
barriers to moving forward in these respects are pretty formidable, and significant progress is 
unlikely to occur any time soon, if at all. 
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